

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 111289
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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DRAFTED BY:P:TMILLER

APPROVED BY:P:TMILLER

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 111289

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS, FOR DICK PETRIE

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 3329 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS
NICOSIA USUN WHITE HOUSE MAY 1

QUOTE S E C R E T ANKARA 3329

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, TU

SUBJECT: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS

PASS AMBASSADOR YOUNG

REF: ANKARA 3328

1. OKCUN CALLED ME BACK THIS AFTERNOON TO GIVE ME TURKISH
REACTION TO OUR SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS FOR DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER'S
MAY 2 STATEMENT IN SENATE HEARINGS. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
DCM AND HE WAS AGAIN ACCOMPANIED BY HALUK OZGUL.

2. OKCUN SAID THAT GOT HAD STUDIED OUR PROPOSALS AND WISHED
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TO SUGGEST A DIFFERENT APPROACH. HE THEN HANDED ME THE
FOLLOWING PAPER:

QTE: THE SUGGESTED STATE DEPARTMENT APPROACH TO CONGRESSIONAL
DISCUSSIONS IS OF A NATURE THAT WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO A
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT, SO LONG
AS THIS OPPORTUNITY IS AVAILABLE TO THE GREEKS CYPRIOTS, THEY
WILL TEND TO DECLINE FROM ACCEPTING THE RESUMPTION OF THE
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND LEAVE THE MATTER TO THE U.S. CONGRESS.
BECAUSE WHEN TAKEN UP AT THE U.S. CONGRESS, RATHER THAN IN THE

INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THE PROBLEM WILL BE TURNED INTO A TOPIC OF BARGAINING BETWEEN THE U.S. CONGRESS AND TURKEY-VIA THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT-RATHER THAN REMAIN A TOPIC TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PROPER PARTIES--THAT IS, THE TURKISH AND GREEK CYPRIOTS. THE GREEKS WILL REGARD IT AS MUCH MORE ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE THE EMBARGO PRESSURE OVER TURKEY WILL BE FULLY AND DIRECTLY UTILIZED AND MANIPULATED. THE GREEK SIDE WILL NO MORE BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A PARTY TO THE PROBLEM BUT WILL CHOOSE TO BE A PROVOCATIVE SPECTATOR. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, IN THAT CASE, WILL BE INTERNATIONALIZED AND WILL BECOME INSOLUBLE, WITH ITS UNAVOIDABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES ON TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, ON RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE, ON NATO, AS WELL AS ON CYPRUS ITSELF.

THE SUGGESTED STATE DEPARTMENT APPROACH TO CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS EXPECTS, IN EFFECT, THE TURKISH SIDE TO BE ENGAGED IN A PRE-NEGOTIATION' PROCESS, IN WHICH THE GREEK SIDE, THROUGH THE U.S., WOULD FORCE TURKEY TO PUT PRESSURE UPON THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO CHANGE THEIR DECLARED NEGOTIATING POSITION EVEN BEFORE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS START, SO THAT THEY MAY BE IN A MUCH BETTER BARGAINING POSITION WHEN AND IF THE TALKS START, HAVING OBTAINED, EVEN BEFORE THE
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INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, MOST OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THEY WILL FEEL ENTITLED TO ASK FOR MORE.

THE PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT, WITH ITS KNOWN INTERNAL PROBLEMS, HAS ALREADY TAKEN OVER TOO MUCH POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS REACHED THE LIMITS OF ITS FIELD OF ACTION. THE RESPONSIBILITY UNDERTAKEN BY THE PRESENT TURKISH GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE MINIMIZED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT WAIT FOR THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO BEFORE ENCOURAGING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO COME OUT WITH CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROPOSALS. THERE ARE ALSO LIMITS TO THE DEGREE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CAN INFLUENCE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, WHICH IS ALSO FACED WITH GREAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

IF THE GREEKS NOTICE THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ARE WAVERING, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ADOPT AN INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE EVEN IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT NEGOTIATING POSITION IS TO BE CHANGED. THE HESITATION AND THE OVER-INVOLVEMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS HAS ALREADY STARTED SHOWING ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS:

--BY ENCOURAGING THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO ADOPT AN AN INCREASINGLY INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, AND
-- BY ENCOURAGING THE ATHENS GOVERNMENT TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY THE HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL TALKS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE THAT WERE DECIDED IN MONTREUX, THEREBY DAMAGING THE DIALOGUE THAT WAS INITIATED BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS.

WE WOULD INSIST THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SHOULD
REFRAIN FROM ADOPTING A LINE, DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL
DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO INDICATING:

- THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT NEGOTIATING POSITION
HAS BEEN OR COULD BE CHANGED;
- OR THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WAS READY TO RELINQUISH
SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN SHE IS, IN EFFECT,
PREPARED OR ABLE TO;

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-- THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ITSELF CONSIDERS THE
CYPRUS ISSUE AS INEXTRICABLE LINKED WITH THE EMBARGO.
THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION SHOULD ALSO SEE TO IT THAT
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BECOME A
TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, FOR, OBVIOUSLY,
THAT IS NOT THE RIGHT FLOOR FOR SUCH A PROBLEM
TO BE TAKEN UP IN DETAIL AND IT WOULD ONLY RESULT IN
AGGRAVATING, NOT ONLY THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BUT ALSO
THE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
COULD AND SHOULD STRESS THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- THE TURKISH SIDE HAS SHOWN ITS GOODWILL AND
UNDERTAKEN GREAT POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY BY
TAKING CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL STEPS FOR THE
SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, BEFORE WAITING
FOR THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO;
- TURKEY HAS GIVEN AN ADDED PROOF OF HER GOODWILL
BY WITHDRAWING MORE TROOPS FROM CYPRUS EVEN AFTER
THE GREEKS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT CONSENT
TO SIT AROUND THE TABLE FOR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS;
- IT HAS BEEN OPENLY STATED THAT THE TURKISH
CYPRIOT PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE A "NEGOTIATING
POSITION", INDICATING THAT THE TURKS ARE NOT
RIGID BUT ARE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE DURING THE
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS;
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TESTIFY TO THE
RYPRIOT TURKS SERIOUS INTENTION OF SETTING UP A
REAL AND EFFECTIVE FEDERATION FROM THE
BEGINNING -- A FEDERATION WHICH COULD EVOLVE
WITH TIME INTO AN EVEN MORE CLOSELY-KNIT
PATTERN OF COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP;

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- IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE HAS
MADE AN IMPORTANT GESTURE OF GOODWILL BY
RXPRESSING ITS READINESS TO ALLOW SUBSTANTIAL
NUMBERS OF GREEKS TO SETTLE IN VAROSHA

WHICH IS ECONOMICALLY THE MOST IMPORTANT AND
REWARDING PLACE ON THE ISLAND;

- IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS
ARE NOT RIGID ABOUT THE POLITICAL STATUS OF
VAROSHA AND ARE OPEN TO CONSIDER VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE
FORMULAS ONCE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE RESUMED;
- THE TURKISH PROPOSALS ARE VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH
THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON BETWEEN DENKTASH AND
THE LATE MAKARIOS ON 12TH FEBRUARY 1977 AND
INTERPRET THESE PRINCIPLES IN A RATHER CONSTRUCTIVE
AND GENEROUS WAY WHICH SHOWS THAT THE TURKISH SIDE
IS CONSISTENT;
- IF THE CONGRESS SEEMS RELUCTANT TO LIFT THE
EMBARGO, THE GREEKS WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO ADOPT AN
INCREASINGLY MORE TRANSIGENT ATTITUDE AND WILL
DECLINE TO RECIPROCATATE THE WELL-INTENTIONED
ADVANCES MADE BY THE TURKISH SIDE, AS A RESULT
OF WHICH A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR SOLVING
THE CYPRUS ISSUE WOULD BE MISSED, THE
POSSIBILITY OF A RAPPROCHMENT BETWEEN
TURKEY AND GREECE WOULD BE LOST AND THE
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS WELL AS THE
SOUTHEASTERN WING OF NATO COULD BECOME
IRREPARABLY DAMAGED.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE IMPRESSED UPON MR. WALDHEIM THAT
HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO DECLINE FROM CALLING FOR THE
RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, PARTICULARLY
AFTER HE ADMITTED THAT THE TURKISH PROPOSALS WERE
"CONCRETE AND SUBSTANTIAL", AS THIS WOULD PUT HIM IN
THE POSITION OF AN ARBITER (AND A BIASED ONE)-- A
POSITION THAT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH HIS GOOD-
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OFFICES FUNCTION. IF HE DOES DECLINE, WE WILL SHARE
A GREAT PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADVERSE
DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY TAKE PLACE IN THE FUTURE, NOT ONLY
WITH REGARD TO CYPRUS, BUT ALSO WITH REGARD TO THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE
U.S.

THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE FACED WITH AT THIS
STAGE, RESEMBLES THE UNFORTUNATE SITUATION THAT WE HAD
BEEN FACED WITH YEARS AGO IN CONNECTION WITH THE "DEAN
ACHESON FORMULA":

THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, HAVING OBTAINED
THE CONSENT OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FOR THAT FORMULA,
RETREATED FROM ITS OWN POSITION WHEN THE GREEKS
REJECTED IT. THE U.S. THEN CAME FORTH WITH ANOTHER
"DEAN ACHESON FORMULA" WHICH WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS
ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE TURKS THEN THE FIRST ONE. THE

TURKISH SIDE ACCEPTED EVEN THE SECOND PROPOSAL IN GOOD FAITH BUT THE U.S. AGAIN RETREATED UNDER GREEK PRESSURE. ALL THESE UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENTS, AT THAT TIME, CREATED A SERIOUS CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN TURKEY VIS-A-VIS TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND RESULTED IN A PROLONGATION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN INCREASINGLY AGGRAVATED FORM THROUGH THE YEARS, WHICH EVENTUALLY LED TO THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE SUMMER OF 1974.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A SIMILAR U.S. APPROACH NOW WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT PRODUCE ANY BETTER RESULTS. UNQTE

3. AFTER STUDYING PAPER, I TOLD OKCUN THAT TURKISH RESPONSE WOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN WASHINGTON. I COULD SEE ONLY TWO POSITIVE ELEMENTS:

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THE STATEMENT THAT THE TURK NEGOTIATING POSITION WAS NOT RIGID AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE; AND THE STATEMENT THAT TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT BE RIGID ABOUT FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF VAROSHA. I COMMENTED THAT THE TURKS WERE IGNORING THE REAL CONDITIONS IN THE CONGRESS WHERE THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE PEOPLE TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS, NO MATTER WHAT THE TURKS THOUGHT ABOUT IT THOSE PEOPLE WHO WERE BEING ASKED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS DID CONNECT CYPRUS AND THE EMBARGO. I SAID THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT THE TURKISH PAPER TO WASHINGTON AND THEN COMMENTED THAT AT SOME POINT THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO STATE ITS VIEWS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. I AM REPORTING THAT PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION SEPTTEL.

4. LATER OZGUL TELEPHONED FROM FONMINISTRY TO CALL OUR ATTENTION TO PARA IN PAPER CITING MARKARIOS-DENKTASH AGREEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. HE SAID OKCUN BELIEVED WE SHOULD STRESS THIS AGREEMENT IN OUR PRESENTATION TO CONGRESS. OZGUL SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPLIED FOLLOWING TEXT OF AGREEMENT:

QTE 12 FEB 1977 DENKTASH-MAKARIOS AGREEMENT

DURING OUR TALKS, WHICH LASTED FOR FOUR HOURS, INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS THE BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED TO RECONVENE THE CYPRUS TALKS IN VIENNA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETRAY GENERAL AT THE END OF MARCH.

THE TEXT OF THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS (GUIDELINES) REFERRED TO IN THE ABOVE COMMUNIQUE READS AS FOLLOWS:

1- WE ARE SEEKING AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED,
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BI-COMMUNAL FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

2- THE TERRITORY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF
EACH COMMUNITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE LIGHT OF
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OR PRODUCTIVITY AND LAND OWNERSHIP.

3- QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLES LIKE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT, FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT, THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY
AND OTHER SPECIFIC MATTERS, ARE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF A BI-
COMMUNAL FEDERAL SYSTEM AND CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
WHICH MAY ARISE FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

4- THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT WILL BE SUCH AS TO SAFEGUARD THE UNITY OF
THE COUNTRY, HAVING REGARD TO THE BI-COMMUNAL CHARACTER
OF THE STATE. UNQTE

5. COMMENT: TURK RESPONSE CONTAINED IN TEXT
IS VERY HARD AND DOES NOT RESPOND TO THE SPIRIT
OF OUR REQUEST, I.E. THAT WE HAD A COMMON PROBLEM AND
WERE SOLICITING TURKISH COOPERATION IN SOLVING IT. THE
PAPER ALSO ILLUSTRATES THE DEPTH OF OUR PROBLEM: THE TURKS
DO NOT TRUST US AND ARE NOT YET FULLY CONVINCED THAT
WE ARE TRYING IN GOOD FAITH TO GET THE EMBARGO RAISED.
THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE (AT LEAST HALF WAY) THAT
WE ARE ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE GREEKS.
SPIERS. UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, POLICIES, NEGOTIATIONS, AMBASSADORS, CAT-B, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, EMBARGOES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 may 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE111289
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: REPEAT OF ANKARA 3329
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: N780004-0754
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197805112/baaaeynt.tel
Line Count: 304
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 95763895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NODIS
Reference: ANKARA 3328
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2539312
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS PASS AMBASSADOR YOUNG
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY, TU, US
To: USUN N Y
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/95763895-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014